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On the probable cause issue, the CCA refers to the many 
sightings by witnesse.s of petitioner's truck, particularly the 
identification of the pick-up by one of the witnesses as on~ at which 
the victim had stopped to converse with the driver earlier in the 
day. (That this particular identification was known to the police 
prior to the arrest apparently is conceded by petitioner. cert 
petition at 52 n. 56.] The CCA also notes the awareness of the 
arresting officers of the outstanding warrant for petitioner. 
In response, the State aligns itself with the CCA. 
Discussion: Again, this appears to '"be a "totality of the 
circumstances" issue similar to the one raised in Gregg. And 
again, although certain of the circumstances may be disturbing, 
the question is a factual one and the determinations below weigh 
heavily against its merit. 
Conclusion: Certiorari may be limited to question 1. 
4. ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA, 75-5844: 
Facts: The facts provided by the present pleadings are 
very sketchy. No response has been received. The evidence 
petitioner was convicted on is not stated either in the cert petition 
or in the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion. The cert petition 
does not provide a statement of facts. 
The opinion surrunarily relates that Richard Lowe, an 
attendant of a gas station, wasshot and killed during an armed 
robbery committed by petitioner and one Calvin Arceneaux. 
Petitioner and Arceneaux entered the station office unarmed but 
removed a revolver from a desk drawer and used it to threaten, 
and finally kill; the attendant. The robbery netted petitioner 
and his accomplice two guns, two empty money bags and three 
dollars. The murder weapon was entered into evidence. 
Contentions: Petitioner raises only a capital punishment 
question: 
111. Whether the imposition and carrying out 
of the sentence of death for the crime of first degree 
murder under the law of Louisiana violates the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States? 11 
Discussion: Obviously petitioner confessed or Arceneaux 
testified at the trial, but no confession issue was raised below 
and although petitioner raises prosecutorial discretion in his 
capital punislunent argument, he does not allude to any deals 
made involving Arceneaux. The status of Arceneaux is not revealed. 
Similarly, no search and seizure issue was raised below. Aside 
from the capital punislunent issue and the Taylor issue (women 
were excluded from petitioner's grand and petit juries), petitioner 
raised no substantive federal issues in the State Supreme Court. 
Conclusion: The particulars of this case remain to be 
divulged. On the issues presented, however, there is no need to 
limit certiorari. 
5. WOODSON and WAXTON v. NORTH CAROLINA, 75-5491: 
Facts: Petitioners' convictions for first degree (felony) 
murder were based on their own testimony at trial and on the 
testimony of two accomplices, Tucker and Carroll, who were 
permitted to plead to lesser offenses and were sentenced to terms 
of imprisonment of from 20-30 years. 
The testimony established that petitioners, Waxton (age 24) 
and Woodson (age 23), and two other black men- -Tucker (18) and 
Carroll (19)--planned the armed robbery of an E-Z Shop in Dunn, 
N.C. Tucker and petitioner Waxton entered the store while Carroll 
and petitioner Woodson remained in a car outside. As she was 
about to wait on him, petitioner Waxton shot and killed the white 
shop attendant. [The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that 
the only significant difference in the testimony relates to who fired 
the shot that killed the store attendant; and, since each admitted 
bein~ one of the four who conspired to rob the shop, legally it 
makes no difference whether Waxton or Tucker did it. Waxton, 
understandably, points the finger at Tucker. Tucker accuses 
Waxton, The testimony of Carroll and Woodson, although not 
eyewitnesses, strongly implicates petitioner Waxton. No findings 
are made on this point below.] 
Contentions: Petitioners present only the capital punish-
ment question: 
''Whether the imposition and carrying out of 
the sentence of death for the crime of murder under 
the law of North Carolina violates the Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States? 11 
Conclusion: Certiorari need not be limited. 
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No. 75-5844 ROBERTS v. LOUISIANA 
Capital Case - Louisiana Statute 
Mandatory death penalty prescribed for a narrow range 
of offenses, characterized as "murder in the first degree". 
Murder in the first degree is defined as the killing of a 
human being: 
(1) With specific intent to kill or to inflict 
great bodily harm: 
(a) During the commission of an aggravated 
felony (kidnapping, rape, burglary or 
armed robbery); 
(b) An on-duty fireman or peace officer; 
(c) When the defendant has a prior murder 
conviction or is serving a life sentence; or 
(d) The defendant has a specific intent to 
kill "more than one person". 
(e) For hire. 
Some of the factors in the Louisiana statute, that are 
made elements of the crime itself, are included in other 
statutes as "aggravating circumstances". 
The Louisiana statute, to this point, is an attempt 
to define narrowly the crimes for which a deat h sanction may 
be imposed. For the most part, the definitions are fairly 
specific and objective in identifying the additional factors 
that must be found. 
Under Louisiana law, the jury - in every first degree 
murder case - must be instructed by the judge that it may find 
2. 
a verdict for the lesser crimes of second degree murder or 
manslaughter. Failure so to instruct is reversible error, 
and the nature of the evidence is immaterial. Thus, the jury 
has the right, always, to return a verdict of manslaughter 
rather than for murder. 
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.Petitioner, ) On Writ of Certiorari to · the 
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STATE OF LOUISIANA. 
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On August 18, 1973, in the early hours of the morning,. 
Richard G. Lowe was found dead in the office of the gas station 
at which he worked. He had been shot four times in the head. 
The police recovered four spent projedtiles .from a .38 caliber 
pistol at the scene. 
About six months la.ter, the . police recovered a . gun, sub ... 
sequently identified as the murder weapon, from a cafe and beer 
' y 
parlor operator. The gun was traced back to th¢ petitioner. 
Four men--petitioner, Huey Cormier, Everett Walls, and Calvin 
Arcenaux--were subsequently arrested for complicity in the 
murder. 
At trial, Cormier, Walls, and Arceriaux testified against 
2/ ' 
petitioner. Their testimony e~tablished- that just before 
1/ The gun, a .38 caliber revolver, was readily recognizable. 
It was an "uncommon type gun,'' (R. 70) , which had been sold to the 
owner of the gas station by a police ~fficer. The police force 
had, after the shooting, been instructed to be on the lookout for 
this gun. 
2/ Since petitioner was convicted, we read the testimony in the 





midnight on August 17, petitioner had discussed with Walls and 
Cormier the subject of "ripping off that old man at the station." 
Petitioner indicated that Arcenaux was to accompany him. Cormier 
and Walls, however, declined to participate. 
Arcenaux testified that on the early morning of August 18, 
'he and petitioner went to the gas station and asked the eventual 
victim, Lowe, for work. Lowe told them there were no jobs 
available. They left, but crept back into the station office 
through a rear entrance while Lowe was outside waiting on a car. 
There was no evidence to indicate that either petitioner or 
Arcenaux was armed at this point. 
Arcenaux "crawled" to a desk drawer and removed from it a 
pistol which belonged to the station owner. Petitioner asked 
Arcenaux to give him the pistol. According to Arcenaux, petitioner 
"was kind of mad when I had it. He just said he wanted it because 
he had never killed a white dude before, and he always wanted to 
kill a white dude." (R. 190). When Lowe returned to the office, 
petitioner held him by the collar and Arcenaux hit him while 
they shoved him into a small back room. When they had all been in 
the room for about five minutes, a car drove up. Arcenaux went 
out and, posing as the station attendant, gav~ the motorist about 
three dollars worth of gas. While still out in front, he heard 
four shots from inside the station. He went back inside and 
found Lowe on the floor, bleeding. Petitioner was no longer there. 
Arcenaux grabbed some empty "money bags" and ran from the station. 
Cormier testified that as he was walking home from a bar, he 
saw Arcenaux run from the filling station. Cormier then went horne 
and went to bed. Some time later he heard a knock on the door. 
Petitioner was standing at the door, sweating. When Cormier asked 
petitioner why he was sweating, he replied that "he had just shcit 
that old man ... at the filling station." Cormier also saw that 




Petitioner was indicted by the grand jury on May 9, 1974, 
on a presentment that he "did unlawfully with the specific 
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, while engaged 
in the armed robbery of Richard G. Lowe, commit first degree 
murder by killing one Richard G. Lowe, in violation of Section 
3/ 
One (1) of L.S.A.-R.S. 14:30."- He was found guilty as charged 
by the jury; the judge, as ~equired by statute, sentenced him 
to death. 
The Louisiana legislature in 1973 revised the Louisiana 
statutes relating to murder and the death penalty, apparently 
in response to this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,· 408 
U.S. 238 (1972). Before these amendments, Louisiana law defined 
only the crime of "murder," as the killing of a human being by 
an offender with a specific intent to kill or to inflict great 
bodily harm, or by an offender engaged in the perpetration or 
attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, 
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery or simple 
4/ 
robbery, even without an intent to kill.- The jury was free to 
return a verdict of guilty, guilty without capital punishment, 
5/ 
guilty of manslaughter or not guilty.-
The legislature, in the 1973 amendments, changed this dis-
cretionary statute to one wholly mandatory, requiring that the 
death penalty be imposed whenever the jury should find the defendant 
guilty of the newly described crime of first degree murder. This 
~/ This version of the indictment includes immaterial amendments 
made May 22, 1974, after the Court had convened on the first day 
of the trial but before the trial had commenced. 
!/ La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30. 
~/ La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 814 (1967). 
- 3 -
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new statute, under which petitioner was charged, provides in 
part that first degree murder is the killing of a human being 
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict 
great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or 
attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated 
6/ 
rape, or armed robbery.-
The amended statute describes second degree murder in 
much the same terms as those used by the prior statute to describe 
6/ La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (as amended by La. Acts 1973, 
Act 109): 
"First degree murder. 
First degree murder is the killing of ~ human being: 
{1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill 
or to ihflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated 
kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or 
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, 
or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a fireman or a 
peace officer' who was engaged in the performance of his 
lawful duties; or 
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill 
or to inflict great bodily harm and has pre.viously been 
convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life 
se~tence; or 
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill 
or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; [or] 
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit 
murder and has been offered or has received anything of 
value for committing the murder. 
For the purposes of paragraph (2) herein, the term 
peace officer shall be defined and include any constable, 
sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game 
warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison 
guard, parole officer, probation of£icer, judge, district 
attorney, assistant district attorney or district attorneys' 
investigator. 
Whoever commits the crime of first degree· murder shall 
be punished by death ... -
Un 1975, §14.30(1) . was amended to add the crime of 
aggravated burglary as a predicate felony for first degree __ 






murder. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being 
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict 
great bodily harm, ££ when the offender is engaged in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain specified 
felonies, including armed robbery, even though the offender has 
no intent to kill. 
Under the former statute, the jury had the choice in any case 
where it found the defendant guilty of murder of returning either 
a verdict of guilty, which required the imposition of the death 
penalty, or a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, in 
8/ 
which case the punishment was imprisonment at hard labor for life.-
Under the new statute the jury is required only to determine whether 
both conditions existed at the time of the killing; if there was a 
specific intent to kill, and th~ offender was engaged in an armed 
robbery, the offense is first degree murder and the mandatory 
punishment is death. If only one of these conditions existed, 
the offense is second deqree murder and the mandatorv ounishme~t ~~ 
]_/ La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 (enacted La. Acts 1973 1 Act 111}: 
"Second degree murder. 
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: 
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or 
to inflict great bodily harm; or 
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration 
or attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated 
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed 
robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent 
to kill. 
Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder 
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for life and shall 
not be eligible for parole, probation or suspension 
of sentence :Eor a period of twenty years." 
[In 1975, §14:30.1 wa~ amended to increase the per~od of 
pnrole ineligibility from twenty to forty years follow1ng a 
conviction for second degree murder. Act. No. 380, West's La. 
Sess. L. Serv. 1975, at 665.] 
~/ La. Co~e Crim •. Proc: Ann. § 814 (19671 enumerated '~guilty 
Wlt~out ca~1tal pun1shment" as one of the responsive verdicts 
ava1lable 1n a murder case, La, Code, Crim. Proc, Ann,~ Art, 






imprisonment at hard labor for life. Any qualification or 
recommendation which a jury might add to its verdict--such as 
a recommendation of mercy where the verdict is "guilty of first 
9/ 
degree murder"--is without any effect.-
-- ........ "' ............. 
Thus, like the North Carolina statute discussed in Woodson 
v. North Carolina, ante at , the Louisiana murder statute leaves 
no room at all for an individualized determination of whether the 
death penalty is appropriate for the particular criminal who has 
committed this particular crime in this particular way. 
9/ La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 817 (1975 Supp.) (as amended 






.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§nprtttU <!fO'Url ttf tlrt ~tb ;§ta±tg 
,.-ulrittghm. J). <!f. 2Ilbi~~ 
June 17, 1976 
Re: No. 75-5844 - Roberts v. Louisiana 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
sincerelyr 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
···'" 
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